Based on an EPR pair of qubits and allowing asymptotically secure key distribution, a secure communication protocol is presented. Bob sends either of the EPR pair qubits to Alice. Alice receives the travel qubit. Then she can encode classical information by local unitary operations on this travel qubit. Alice send the qubit back to Bob. Bob can get Alice's information by measurement on the two photons in Bell operator basis. If Eve in line, she has no access to Bob's home qubit. All her operations are restricted to the travel qubit. In order to find out which opeartion Alice performs, Eve's operation must include measurements. The EPR pair qubits are destroyed. Bob's measurement on the two photons in Bell operator basis can help him to judge whether Eve exist in line or not. In this protocal, a public channel is not necessary. [5] . The motive that we build quantum-mechanical communications channels is not only to transmit information securely without being eavesdropped on but also to transmit information more efficiently. We consider that quantum channel is secure because that quantum physics establishes a set of negative rules stating things that cannot be done [2]: (1) One cannot take a measurement without perturbing the system. (2) One cannot determine simultaneously the position and the momentum of a particle with arbitrarily high accuracy. (3) One cannot simultaneously measure the polarization of a photon in the verticalhorizontal basis and simultaneously in the diagonal basis. (4) One cannot draw pictures of individual quantum processes. (5) One cannot duplicate an unknown quantum state. These characters of quantum physics let us have ability to exchange information securely.
The idea of quantum cryptography was first proposed in the 1970s by Stephen Wiesner [1] and by Charles H. Bennett of IBM and Gilles Brassard of The University of Montreal [5] . The motive that we build quantum-mechanical communications channels is not only to transmit information securely without being eavesdropped on but also to transmit information more efficiently. We consider that quantum channel is secure because that quantum physics establishes a set of negative rules stating things that cannot be done [2] : (1) One cannot take a measurement without perturbing the system. (2) One cannot determine simultaneously the position and the momentum of a particle with arbitrarily high accuracy. (3) One cannot simultaneously measure the polarization of a photon in the verticalhorizontal basis and simultaneously in the diagonal basis. (4) One cannot draw pictures of individual quantum processes. (5) One cannot duplicate an unknown quantum state. These characters of quantum physics let us have ability to exchange information securely.
As is well known, operations on one particle of an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pair cannot influence the marginal statistics of measurements on the other particle. Let's suppose that Bob have two photons which are maximally entangled in their polarization degree of freedom
These states are maximally entangled states in the two particle Hilbert space H = H A ⊗ H B . Each one of them is not polarized because the reduced density matrices of one photon, say A,
is complete mixture. Since ρ ± A = 1 2 I A , no one can distinguish |ψ ± > (or |φ ± >) only by using the information of photon A. Anyone who has these two photons can perform a measurement on both photons in Bell operator basis which can help him to distinguish the states {|ψ + >, |ψ − >, |φ + >, |φ − >} from each other. Suppose Bob has two photons in Bell states |ψ ± > or |φ ± >, he gives one of them to Alice and keeps another. Then Alice perform an operation which can be described by a unitary operator to the photon she obtained from Bob
where
The local operation of Alice can be encoded in states |ψ ± >. So it becomes nonlocal information. We will give a secure communication protocal based on this. In order to realize the communication, first, Bob prepares an EPR pair photons (suppose in state |ψ + >). Then he sends one of them to Alice and keeps another. Alice receives the photon and perform an operation in order to encode her information. She can perform the operation ∧ σ Z to encode her information "1". Else, she performs the operation I (do nothing) to encode her information "0" . Alice sends the encoded photon to Bob. Bob performs a measurement on both photons in Bell operator basis to judge Alice's operation. If the EPR pair in state |ψ + >, then he know that Alice perform an operation I, else, he know that Alice perform the operation ∧ σ Z . This is a ping − pong protocol [3] . Through this process, Bob can get one bit information from Alice. When Bob's measurement with the result |φ ± >, he knows that there is Eve in the line and stops the communication. We will prove that if there is an Eve in the communication line, Bob can find it certain without any public channel.
The algorithm for this protocol can like this: (1 
To Eve, it seems that Bob sends a qubit in state |0 > or |1 > with probability figure 1 and 2. ) Eve can use all technique quantum mechanics allows. The most general quantum operation is a completely positive map 
where dimH E ≤(dimH A ) 2 . If Eve want to gain information about Alice's operation, she should first perform the unitary operation ∧ E on the composed system, then let Alice perform her coding operation on the travel qubit. After Alice's operation, Eve will finally perform a measurement to judge which operation Alice performs. The state of the travel qubit is a maximal mixture state
to Eve, which can be as a Bob sends the travel qubit in either of the states |0 > or |1 > with equal probability p = 1 2 . In our proof, first we suppose Bob selects the EPR pair in state |ψ + >. Second we suppose that Bob sends the travel qubit in state |0 > to Alice. Eve adds an ancilla in the state |χ > and performs the unitary operation ∧ E on both systems, which will results in
where |χ 0 >, |χ 1 > are pure ancilla states uniquely determined by ∧ E, and |α| 2 + |β| 2 = 1. We change this equation into another form
It has been proved in [3] that if Eve want to get f ull information of Alice's opeartion from the travel qubit, it must result in that d = 1 2 . So equation (8) can be write as
After Eve's attack opeartions, the travel qubit will be sent to Alice. Suppose Alice perform an operation
to encode the information '1'. After Alice's encoding operation, the joint system that includes Bob's home qubit, the travel qubit and Eve's ancilla space is in state
And the system including the travel qubit and Eve's ancilla space is in the state
After Alice's operation, Eve has to measure the travel photon. No measurement implies that Eve cannot get any information about the travel photon. In this process, if Alice' operation is I, then (*1) shoul be written as
and (**1) should be written as
At the beginning of our proof, we have supposed that Bob sends the travel qubit in state |0 >. If Bob sends the travel qubit in states |1 >, (*1) should be written as
when Alice's operation is ∧ σ Z . And (*1) should be written as
(**1) should be written as
when Alice's operation is I. Eve can obtain information with certain by measurement on the travel qubit in basis {
(|1, χ 10 > −|1, χ 11 >)}. After Eve's measurement, the travel qubit will be sent to Bob. Bob does not know whether Eve exist or not, so there is
He measure the two photons in Bell basis, then
If Eve does not exist, which means d = 0, we can see when Alice performs operation I, there is
When Alice operator
We can see that we have supposed that Bob used the EPR pair in state |ψ + > in this process. It is apparent that when Eve exist, Bob will find his measurement result will be in the states |φ ± > with probability If Bob only uses EPR pair in state |ψ + > in the communication, Eve can perform a measurement in her attack operations to determine whether Bob sends the travel qubit in states |0 > or |1 >. After her measurement gained Alice's operation information, she can prepare the travel qubit in the states |0 > or |1 > as it is at the beginning. When Bob selects EPR pair in states |ψ + > or |φ + > randomly with a probability p= 1 2 , Eve can not determine which states Bob select by her measurement on the travel qubit. We have proved that this communication protocol is secure.
We can see that when Eve wants to gain full information in each attack, the ping-pong protocol provides a detection probability P = 1 2 . If Eve exist, after 1000 bits have been transmitted, the probability that Eve was not detected becomes D ≈ 9.33e − 302, which means Eve has already been detected. In fig. 3 , we have plotted the eavsdropping sucess probability with d = 1 2 . In our method, every travel photon can get one bit information back from Alice without Eve in line. Bob's measurement on the two photons in Bell operator basis not only can help him to get information from Alice, but also can can help him to determine whether Eve is in line or not. Obviously, there is no public channel in our method. In BB84's protocol [5] , the states some photons have to be publicized to verdict the communication is secure. In the ping-pong protocol [3] , some EPR pair photons have to be publicized to judge whether Eve exist in line or not through the public channel. In a secure communication protocal, first, an additionl public channel is not economical. On the other hand, a public channel means all information through the public channel is open to Eve. The more information Eve gains, the more difficult the secure communication becomes. 1/bits Probability of success. Fig.3 . Eavesdropping success probability as a function of d=0.5.
